Federalism in India — The Living Architecture of a Diverse Republic

• 2023 — which body’s recommendations are only recommendatory (GST Council; ties to Mohit Minerals).
• 2020 — Inter-State Council: composition and functions (Article 263).
• 2017 — 101st Amendment: GST Council composition, voting, scope.
• 2015 — 73rd/74th Amendments: local self-government as the third tier.
• 2014 — Article 356: conditions and Bommai safeguards.
• 2013 — Finance Commission: basis, composition, recommendatory nature.

• 1. Centralisation vs autonomy — the most-tested angle (2014, 2020 Farm Acts, 2021 CBI, 2022).
• 2. Fiscal federalism — who gets the money (Finance Commissions, GST, cess problem; 2025, 2023, 2017).
• 3. Cooperative, competitive, confrontational federalism (2020, 2015).
• 4. Constitutional mechanisms and their adequacy (ISC, Zonal Councils, GST Council; 2019, 2020).
• 5. Decentralisation as the third tier (73rd/74th, subsidiarity; 2022, 2013).
• 6. Federalism under stress — contemporary flashpoints (Governor, CBI, ONOE, delimitation; 2021, 2020).

Trend alert: federalism has appeared every year from 2019–2025 — the most consistently tested GS-2 theme. For 2026 expect the Governor’s assent controversy, the 16th FC’s fiscal impact, or ONOE. Delimitation is the sleeper — if Census 2027 is announced, it turns hot.

Federal features: dual polity; a written Constitution dividing powers (Seventh Schedule — Union, State, Concurrent Lists); independent judiciary as arbiter (Articles 131–132); bicameral legislature with the Rajya Sabha representing states; rigidity of key provisions (Article 368 needs state ratification for some amendments).

Unitary features: single Constitution; single citizenship; integrated judiciary; All India Services serving both levels; emergency provisions (Articles 352, 356, 360); Parliament’s power to alter state boundaries without consent (Articles 2, 3); residuary powers with the Union (Article 248); a Centre-appointed Governor.

Indian federalism is not a copy of the American model. It is “holding together” federalism (a unitary state devolving power downward), not “coming together” federalism (independent units pooling power upward) — Alfred Stepan’s distinction, a high-scoring reference.

Congress ruled both the Centre and almost every state, so Centre-State tension was minimal — not by constitutional design but by single-party control. The Planning Commission (1950) became the real centre of fiscal power, allocating development funds with conditions. K. Santhanam warned in 1963 that India had become “virtually a unitary state.” Article 356 was used sparingly (8 times, 1950–66), but the 1959 dismissal of Kerala’s Communist government set a dangerous precedent.

The 1967 elections were a watershed: Congress lost 8 states. With different parties at the two levels, friction began — and Article 356 was misused over 40 times between 1967 and 1977. Tamil Nadu’s Rajamannar Committee (1969) demanded drastic cuts to central power. The Sarkaria Commission (1983–88) made 247 recommendations — Article 356 as a “last resort,” a floor test before dismissal, and activation of the Inter-State Council. The Emergency (1975–77) was the darkest hour; the 42nd Amendment (1976) moved five subjects (education, forests, weights and measures, protection of wild animals and birds, administration of justice) from the State to the Concurrent List — never reversed.

Regional parties became kingmakers; coalition politics, not constitutional text, became the greatest protector of state autonomy. The S.R. Bommai judgment (1994) made federalism part of the basic structure, subjected Article 356 to judicial review, and mandated a floor test — cutting Article 356 misuse by over 85%. The 73rd and 74th Amendments (1992) created the constitutional third tier (Panchayats and Municipalities; Articles 243G/243W). The 14th Finance Commission (2015–20) raised devolution from 32% to 42% — the largest jump ever — and NITI Aayog replaced the Planning Commission (2015).

Single-party dominance returned; by mid-2026 the NDA governs 19 of 28 states. Cooperative-federalism initiatives (NITI Aayog Governing Council, Aspirational Districts, EODB rankings, the GST Council) coexist with real strain: GST (101st Amendment, 2017) subsumed most state indirect taxes, and the COVID-era compensation dispute was a flashpoint; Governor controversies peaked (Tamil Nadu — 10 Bills withheld 17 months; the April 2025 Supreme Court judgment and the November 2025 Presidential Reference); the farm laws (2020–21) used the Concurrent List to legislate on effectively State-List subjects; the cess-and-surcharge share rose from ₹1.99 lakh crore (2016-17) to ₹5.82 lakh crore (2026-27), shrinking the divisible pool; the 16th Finance Commission (Arvind Panagariya; 2026–31) kept 41% despite 18 states demanding 50% and added a “contribution to GDP” weight; One Nation One Election (129th Amendment Bill, 2024) and the delimitation debate (southern states fearing a “demographic penalty” after Census 2027) are the emerging structural flashpoints.

India 2026: 28 states, 8 UTs, 16th FC at 41% devolution, GST Council as the only constitutional fiscal-federal body, a weak Inter-State Council, and at least four major Supreme Court federal judgments in five years (Bommai reaffirmed, Mohit Minerals, TN Governor, the Presidential Reference).