Act 1 — The Nehruvian consensus: centralised federalism (1950–1967)
Congress ruled both the Centre and almost every state, so Centre-State tension was minimal — not by constitutional design but by single-party control. The Planning Commission (1950) became the real centre of fiscal power, allocating development funds with conditions. K. Santhanam warned in 1963 that India had become “virtually a unitary state.” Article 356 was used sparingly (8 times, 1950–66), but the 1959 dismissal of Kerala’s Communist government set a dangerous precedent.
Act 2 — The era of federal confrontation (1967–1990)
The 1967 elections were a watershed: Congress lost 8 states. With different parties at the two levels, friction began — and Article 356 was misused over 40 times between 1967 and 1977. Tamil Nadu’s Rajamannar Committee (1969) demanded drastic cuts to central power. The Sarkaria Commission (1983–88) made 247 recommendations — Article 356 as a “last resort,” a floor test before dismissal, and activation of the Inter-State Council. The Emergency (1975–77) was the darkest hour; the 42nd Amendment (1976) moved five subjects (education, forests, weights and measures, protection of wild animals and birds, administration of justice) from the State to the Concurrent List — never reversed.
Act 3 — The coalition era: federalism by compulsion (1990–2014)
Regional parties became kingmakers; coalition politics, not constitutional text, became the greatest protector of state autonomy. The S.R. Bommai judgment (1994) made federalism part of the basic structure, subjected Article 356 to judicial review, and mandated a floor test — cutting Article 356 misuse by over 85%. The 73rd and 74th Amendments (1992) created the constitutional third tier (Panchayats and Municipalities; Articles 243G/243W). The 14th Finance Commission (2015–20) raised devolution from 32% to 42% — the largest jump ever — and NITI Aayog replaced the Planning Commission (2015).
Act 4 — The new federal stress: centralisation in a majoritarian era (2014–present)
Single-party dominance returned; by mid-2026 the NDA governs 19 of 28 states. Cooperative-federalism initiatives (NITI Aayog Governing Council, Aspirational Districts, EODB rankings, the GST Council) coexist with real strain: GST (101st Amendment, 2017) subsumed most state indirect taxes, and the COVID-era compensation dispute was a flashpoint; Governor controversies peaked (Tamil Nadu — 10 Bills withheld 17 months; the April 2025 Supreme Court judgment and the November 2025 Presidential Reference); the farm laws (2020–21) used the Concurrent List to legislate on effectively State-List subjects; the cess-and-surcharge share rose from ₹1.99 lakh crore (2016-17) to ₹5.82 lakh crore (2026-27), shrinking the divisible pool; the 16th Finance Commission (Arvind Panagariya; 2026–31) kept 41% despite 18 states demanding 50% and added a “contribution to GDP” weight; One Nation One Election (129th Amendment Bill, 2024) and the delimitation debate (southern states fearing a “demographic penalty” after Census 2027) are the emerging structural flashpoints.
India 2026: 28 states, 8 UTs, 16th FC at 41% devolution, GST Council as the only constitutional fiscal-federal body, a weak Inter-State Council, and at least four major Supreme Court federal judgments in five years (Bommai reaffirmed, Mohit Minerals, TN Governor, the Presidential Reference).